Organizational and political leaders often engage in -divide-and-conquer‖ transgression, in which a leader extracts surplus from a victim and shares it with a beneficiary to gain the latter's support for his transgression. This paper conducts the first experimental study to evaluate how repeated interactions with and without communication between -responders‖ can coordinate their resistance towards divide-and-conquer transgressions. It also investigates theoretically and empirically how social preferences can affect successful resistance against divide-and-conquer transgressions with repetition. In our experiment, repetition without communication reduces the transgression rate. Joint resistance is more common in early rounds of a supergame when players have more uncertainty about social preference types, and leaders target beneficiaries who resist transgression. We also find that repetition alone is only as effective as cheap talk communication in the one-shot game in reducing transgression. Our findings suggest that the risk associated with cooperation can impose a limit on the effectiveness of repeated interaction in facilitating cooperation in this repeated Coordinated Resistance game.
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Introduction
Organizational and political leaders often engage in strategic behavior to extract surplus from their subordinates. A strategy widely used by leaders is -divide-and-conquer,‖ in which a leader extracts surplus from a victim and shares it with a beneficiary to gain the latter's support of his transgression. Such leader transgressions have significant negative impacts on economic development and organizational performance, as they discourage investments (North and Weingast, 1989) and undermine organizational members' confidence in commitments made by the leader (Williamson, 1985; Miller, 1992) . It is therefore important to identify and better understand mechanisms that can deter such transgressions. This paper conducts the first experimental study to evaluate how repeated interactions with and without communication between -responders‖ can coordinate their resistance towards divide-and-conquer transgressions.
It also investigates theoretically and empirically how heterogeneous social preferences can affect successful resistance against divide-and-conquer transgressions with repetition.
The use of divide-and-conquer strategy is widely observed in many settings. For example, a political leader may expropriate wealth from one group of citizens, and share it with another group to -bribe‖ them and secure their support (Weingast, 1995 (Weingast, , 1997 Acemoglu et al., 2004) . Leaders of a university may unilaterally alter fiscal arrangements between the central administration and various schools to extract resources for the administration, and share some of these resources with other schools to gain their support. A firm that is negotiating contracts with several unions may offer stringent terms to some and more favorable terms to others to create significant divergent interests among the unions. Despite the widely recognized importance of divide-and-conquer strategies, only recently 1 Kutalik and Biddle (2006) discuss how concessions imposed through bankruptcy court in recent managementunion disputes at several airlines have targeted specific unions. Some unions have joined forces to form the Airline Workers United-an across occupations and airlines organization-to counter this divide-and-conquer strategy.
2 has a small literature emerged that systematically studies their importance. These recent contributions emphasize that the extent to which the responders can solve the coordination problem they face when attempting to organize collective resistance is crucial in determining whether divide-and-conquer transgression will occur in the first place (Weingast, 1995 (Weingast, , 1997 (Weingast, , 2005 Acemoglu et al., 2004) .
Our laboratory Coordinated Resistance (hereafter CR) game is based on a game-theoretic model of divide-and-conquer (hereafter DAC) transgression that Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 develops in his pioneering work in this area. 2 In the one-shot CR game, a first-mover (the -leader‖) decides whether to engage in DAC transgressions. The two responders then simultaneously decide whether to incur costs to challenge the leader. Successful challenge of a DAC transgression requires the beneficiary of the transgression to act against her own material self-interests, and also successfully coordinate with the victim to challenge the leader. Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 considers a model with standard (money-maximizing)
preferences. In this case, since the beneficiary receives a higher material payoff when DAC transgression succeeds, she will never challenge, and all equilibria in the one-shot CR game involve leader transgression. Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 further observes that repeated interactions are often important in the context of leader transgression, and points out that the folk theorem of repeated games (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) implies that if the CR game is repeated indefinitely, then the efficient outcome of No Transgression can be supported as an equilibrium by trigger strategies.
This paper presents theoretical and laboratory results that address four novel questions regarding how repetition may affect divide-and-conquer transgression. First, while the No 3 Transgression outcome can be supported as equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated CR game, the outcome with continual DAC transgression is also an equilibrium. In the presence of multiple equilibria, whether or not repetition has a significant effect in reducing transgression is ultimately an empirical question. This laboratory study provides a controlled environment to address this question.
Second, Weingast's analysis focuses on the case of indefinite repetition. In section 2, however, we show that because the one-shot CR game has multiple equilibria, even with finite repetition and with standard preferences, the No Transgression outcome can be supported as an equilibrium up to the second to the last period (Benoit and Krishna, 1987) . Unlike games such as the prisoner's dilemma where backward induction implies that there will be a sharp difference in equilibrium behavior between finite repetition and infinite repetition, such a major difference does not exist in the repeated CR game. Our experimental design includes both finite and indefinite repetition to evaluate this prediction empirically.
Third, this paper reports theoretical and empirical findings regarding how social preferences can facilitate coordinated resistance and deter DAC transgression in the repeated CR game. A DAC transgression is effectively a proposal by the leader to the beneficiary to collude together to extract surplus from the victim. Thwarting such transgressions requires that the beneficiary act against her material interest to reject this proposal, and also successfully coordinate with the victim to challenge the transgression. The recent literature on social preferences (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Gintis, et al., 2005) suggests that some beneficiaries may be willing to act against their material interest to challenge the transgression even in the one-shot CR game. For example, some may be altruistic punishers Gächter, 2002, Gintis et al., 2005) , who are willing to incur the cost to punish what they regard to be socially undesirable 4 behavior, even when there is no significant scope for repeated interactions.
In an earlier study that focuses exclusively on the one-shot CR game, Cason and Mui (2007) found that non-binding (cheap talk) communication modestly reduces the incidence of transgression This treatment effect is not predicted in a model with standard preferences, providing initial evidence that social preferences may affect outcomes in this CR game without repetition. This raises the natural question of how social preferences may affect behavior when the CR game is repeated, which is not addressed by Cason and Mui (2007) as it only considers the one-shot CR game.
With some notable exceptions, 3 the importance of social preferences in political economy contexts has not received much attention in the literature, especially in the emerging literature on divide-and-conquer transgression (Weingast, 1995 (Weingast, , 1997 (Weingast, , 2005 Acemoglu et al., 2004) . More generally, while researchers have studied repeated games of incomplete information (see Forges, 1992) , little work has looked specifically at the implications of incomplete information about social preferences in repeated games. This paper first derives novel implications regarding incomplete information about social preferences in the repeated CR game theoretically, and then reports experimental findings based on six different repeated game treatments involving 324 human subjects.
Fourth, this experiment also investigates empirically the effects of repetition with and without cheap talk communication. Nearly all related laboratory research has focused on either 3 Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) study costless redistribution from the rich to the poor in a voting model with rich, poor and middle class voters. They show that if a small percentage of rich voters are strongly inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 ) and vote against their material self-interests, or if a significant percentage of middle class voters who are materially unaffected by the redistribution are weakly inequity averse and vote for the redistribution, then redistribution can be supported by majority vote even when a model based on standard preferences predicts that it will be rejected. They also present experimental evidence in support of this observation. Fong (2007) combines a -charity game‖ that involves real welfare recipients as subjects with a survey, and finds that donors are more likely to give money and support transfers to welfare recipients when they believe that the recipients were poor due to bad luck rather than laziness.
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varying the type of repeated interaction or studying the effects of communication. This is one of the first studies to examine their interaction and complementarity using a full factorial design.
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To generate specific empirical hypotheses, we present a formal model of the repeated CR game with incomplete information regarding social preferences. This analysis shows that an interesting separating equilibrium exists in the repeated CR game in which a -social preference type‖ agent can signal her type by challenging DAC transgression as a beneficiary. Successful coordinated challenge against DAC transgression can occur through such signaling in initial periods in the repeated game if both responders are social preference types, and this coordinated challenge can deter the leader from transgression. The analysis, however, also identifies a novel mechanism that limits the role of repetition in facilitating cooperation in the CR game.
Specifically, even if a beneficiary has social preferences and would like to coordinate with the victim to challenge a transgressing leader, she may not challenge in the repeated game because this risks revealing her type to the leader. This can be costly if the other responder has standard preferences and will not challenge DAC transgression as a beneficiary, since the leader may then target his future transgressions against this responder who has social preferences.
We find that empirically, both indefinite and finite repetition reduce transgression 4 The importance of infinitely repeated interaction in facilitating cooperation has been emphasized in the literature, and the laboratory offers a useful environment in which one can implement a probabilistic termination design to directly assess the effects of indefinite repetition. As Duffy and Ochs (2009) point out, however, surprisingly few laboratory studies have exploited this possibility to identify the empirical conditions under which indefinitely repeated play actually facilitates cooperation. Some exceptions include Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) who consider an indefinitely repeated threshold public goods game, and Camera and Casari (2009), Dal Bó (2005) , Duffy and Ochs (2009) , Normann and Wallace (2006) and Dal Bó and Fréchette (2010) who consider indefinitely and finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. These contributions, however, abstract from communication when studying repeated interaction. Interestingly, a similar -dichotomy‖ exists in the experimental literature on communication, which has focused on communication in one-shot games (see, for example, Cooper et al., 1989 Cooper et al., , 1992 Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991; Crawford, 1998) . Few studies have considered repeated play and communication simultaneously (for exceptions see Hackett et al. (1994) , Wilson and Sell (1997) , and Blume and Ortmann (2007) , who all study finitely repeated play with communication). In many field settings, however, both communication and repetition are likely to be present. A full factorial design allows us to study the joint impacts of communication and repetition, and to create -counter-factual‖ environments in which only either communication or repetition exists, so that we can better decompose the effect of each form of coordination as well as understand their interaction.
6 compared to the one-shot game, but by similar rates overall. Consistent with the separating equilibrium in the repeated game, joint resistance is more common in early rounds of a supergame when players have more uncertainty about social preference types, and leaders target beneficiaries who resist DAC transgression. We find that repetition alone is only as effective as cheap talk communication in the one-shot CR game in reducing transgression, and the -intended choice‖ communicated by the beneficiary is crucial in coordinating resistance. Our findings regarding this repeated CR game suggest that the risk associated with cooperation can impose limits on the effectiveness of repeated interaction in improving coordination and efficiency. Figure 1 illustrates the CR game implemented in this study, which is based on Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 and captures the following ideas. First, successful transgression allows the leader to extract surplus from the responders and increases his private payoff, even though it reduces total surplus in society because some surplus is destroyed in the process. In the Figure 1 payoffs, successful transgression against a responder reduces the responder's payoff by 6 and increases the leader's payoff by 3, since a transgression destroys half of the confiscated surplus. Second, challenging is costly to the responders regardless of whether it succeeds, and the responders face a coordination problem in deciding whether to challenge the leader. The transgression will fail if and only if both responders incur the cost to challenge him. Third, multiple equilibria exist in the top subgame when the leader transgresses against both responders. Both responders challenging the leader and both responders acquiescing are possible equilibrium responses by the responders, so this subgame is a -stag hunt‖ game. Fourth, the leader can either transgress against both responders, or can also use a divide-and-conquer strategy. In the Figure 1 payoffs when the leader transgresses against only one responder he shares 1 of the 3 units of the expropriated surplus with the other (-beneficiary‖) responder in an attempt to gain her support.
Repeated Interaction and Social Preferences in the Coordinated Resistance Game
The Repeated CR Game with Standard Preferences
When the leader transgresses in the one-shot game against only one responder, a beneficiary with standard preferences will always acquiesce, so the victim of transgression will also acquiesce. Therefore, by using the DAC strategy the leader can eliminate the threat of coordinated challenge by the responders. The one-shot CR game thus has three (pure strategy) equilibria, and No Transgression is not among them. 5 In one equilibrium, the leader transgresses against both responders, with the expectation that such full scale transgression will not be met by coordinated resistance. In each of the other two equilibria, the leader transgresses against only one of the responders, with the expectation that no responder will challenge him.
As Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 (Benoit and Krishna, 1987) . For example, while the No Transgression outcome cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome in the one-shot CR game, it can be supported as an equilibrium outcome up to the penultimate period of the finitely repeated CR game by the trigger strategy considered above in the absence of discounting, with the modification that in the last period, the leader will practice DAC transgression and the responders will acquiesce.
We provide a complete proof of this result in the appendix, but discuss here the beneficiary's no-deviation condition in the second to the last period to illustrate the main intuition. We assume that if neither responder has acquiesced previously, in the last period the leader will randomize between DAC transgression against A and against B with probability 0.5.
In the second to the last period, if a beneficiary of a DAC transgression does not deviate and 6 Intuitively, the key incentive problem here is to ensure that the beneficiary does not want to deviate. This requires that for a beneficiary, the short run gain from deviating to acquiescing a DAC transgression is smaller than the long run loss from foregone cooperation. This implies   1 2 8 2 14
In the appendix, we show that all other no-deviation conditions are also satisfied.
9 challenges, in expectation she receives   7 5.5  . If she deviates and acquiesces she receives   92  . Since     7 5.5 9 2    , she will not deviate. Although the beneficiary expects that cooperation will break down in the last period, deviation in the second to the last period will trigger the (subgame perfect) equilibrium in which the leader successfully transgresses against both responders. This is worse than the outcome of having an equal chance of being a beneficiary or a victim of a successful DAC transgression. One can then establish by induction that the beneficiary will challenge all DAC transgression in all periods except the last one.
This result suggests that other than the fact that No Transgression cannot be supported as equilibrium in the last period of the finitely repeated version, no sharp difference exists between the sets of equilibrium for the indefinitely and finitely repeated CR game. This contrasts with the prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemmas that have a unique stage game equilibrium, where theory predicts that cooperation will not occur under finite repetition but is possible under indefinite repetition.
The One-Shot CR Game with Social Preferences
Our discussion of the repeated CR game to this point has focused on the case of standard preferences. However, the empirical findings in Cason and Mui (2007) , which considered only one-shot interactions, provide evidence that social preferences can affect behavior in this CR A variety of social preference models may be able to account for the existing findings regarding the one-shot CR game, but not all of such potential models are equally tractable for repeated game analysis. Given that this is a first exploration on how social preferences and repetition affect coordinated resistance against DAC transgressions, we do not attempt to develop the implications of different social preferences models in the repeated CR game and design an experiment to compare their performance. Instead, our objective is to develop -the simplest possible‖ model that can account for existing empirical findings regarding the one-shot CR game through plausible equilibrium mechanisms. The model should also be tractable for use in repeated game analysis, and can generate novel implications to guide empirical analysis. We believe that this is the logical necessary first step in what we hope will be a cumulative and comprehensive effort to understand how different coordinating mechanisms affect collective resistance against DAC transgressions in the presence of heterogeneous social preferences.
For this purpose we use an extension that builds on Cox et al. (2007) . 8 They assume that in a (two-player) sequential move game, when a second-mover with social preferences makes her decision after observing the action chosen by the first-mover, the second-mover's marginal rate of substitution between her income and the income of the first-mover depends on her emotional 11 state toward the first-mover. If the action by the first-mover is perceived negatively (positively)
by the second-mover, this triggers conditional malevolence (benevolence) toward the firstmover. Cox et al. (2007) demonstrate that this tractable model provides a good fit of experimental findings in widely studied sequential games such as the ultimatum game.
Following this approach, we assume that all agents are of two types. With probability p an agent has standard preferences, and with probability (1-p) the agent has social preferences. An agent's type is her private information. Our main concern is whether the presence of beneficiaries who have social preferences will change equilibrium outcomes, so for simplicity we assume that the only emotional reaction that can be triggered in the CR game is the negative reaction toward a transgressing leader by the responders. If a Social Preferences type (hereafter the SP-type) agent i is a responder, she regards a DAC transgression by the leader as undesirable, modeled with the utility function respectively. If an agent is a Standard type (hereafter the S-type), then regardless of whether she is a leader or a responder, she has a utility function
Because the only emotional reaction we focus on is the negative reaction by a responder towards a transgressing leader, an SP-type leader will also have a utility function of
. An earlier version of this paper also allowed an SP-type agent-both as a leader and a responder-to be motivated by unconditional altruism. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported below, so we abstract from unconditional altruism here.
Recall that with standard preferences, both responders acquiescing is the only Nash equilibrium in the subgame played by the responders following a DAC transgression. With social preferences, however, coordinated resistance can occur in equilibrium in the DAC subgame. 
, and the SP-type victim always challenges. The S-type beneficiary always acquiesces, and the SP-type beneficiary challenges with a probability
In all of these equilibria, an S-type beneficiary does not challenge since successful DAC transgression increases her income. In (i), although an SP-type beneficiary prefers successful joint resistance to successful DAC, she will acquiesce if she expects that the victim will acquiesce. Part (ii) says that when
, an SP-type beneficiary's social preferences 13 are sufficiently strong so that she is willing to incur the cost to punish the leader provided that she believes that the victim will also challenge. If the SP-type beneficiary always challenges and the S-type beneficiary always acquiesces, an S-type victim will challenge if she thinks that the probability that the beneficiary is an S-type is lower than some critical value,
The SP-type victim has an even stronger incentive to challenge than the S-type victim because she also regards a DAC transgression as undesirable and wants to punish the leader. Not surprisingly, when the two pure strategy equilibria described in (i) and (ii) exist, the hybrid equilibrium shown in (iii) also exists, in which both the SP-type beneficiary and the Stype victim randomize, while the SP-type victim challenges. In the Appendix, we show how
Result 1 implies that No Transgression can be supported as equilibrium.
Consistent with the empirical findings in Cason and Mui (2007) , parts (ii) and (iii) both suggest that the victim will challenge with a higher probability than the beneficiary, and the hybrid equilibrium in (iii) indicates that the victim may not always challenge in the one-shot game. Social preferences transform the DAC subgame into a stag-hunt game for the responders, with multiple (and Pareto-ranked) equilibria, except for the fact that the S-type beneficiary will always acquiesce and prefers transgression to succeed. Note that if one allows for non-binding communication between the responders in the one-shot CR game, when all agents have standard preferences any indicated intention to challenge by a beneficiary is incredible as Acquiesce is the dominant strategy for such a beneficiary. With heterogeneous preferences, however, a social preferences type beneficiary actually prefers that transgression does not take place. While a babbling equilibrium exists (as always) in this cheap talk game, because an SP-type beneficiary prefers that transgression does not take place while an S-type beneficiary always prefers to 14 acquiesce, there also exists an equilibrium in which the indicated intentions by the responders are informative and can help coordinate resistance.
The Repeated CR Game with Social Preferences
Due to space considerations, we only discuss the indefinitely repeated CR Game with social preferences. However, all the results reported below also hold, with some minor adjustments, for the finitely repeated CR Game with social preferences. 10 Recall that even with standard preferences, the No Transgression outcome can be supported as equilibrium when players are sufficiently patient. Not surprisingly, the same conclusion holds in the presence of social preferences. In particular, we show in the appendix that when
No Transgression can be supported as equilibrium using the trigger strategy discussed earlier.
The repeated CR game with social preferences is a repeated game of incomplete information. When informational asymmetries exist, repetition can serve both as an enforcement mechanism and a signalling mechanism (Forges, 1992) . The trigger strategy equilibrium enables the players to use repetition as an enforcement mechanism to support No Transgression as an equilibrium, but no information transmission occurs in this pooling equilibrium since both an Stype agent and an SP-type agent play the same strategy. Furthermore, transgression never occurs in equilibrium, so this trigger strategy equilibrium does not provide theoretical insight regarding how responders will behave when DAC occurs in the repeated game.
It is therefore natural to ask whether interesting equilibria exist in which revelation of types occurs. We now construct another equilibrium where signaling of types helps coordinate joint resistance. This equilibrium also provides useful guidance for the empirical analysis of 15 subjects' behavior because unlike the trigger strategy discussed above, DAC transgression and challenge can occur on the equilibrium path. Here we provide an informal description of this separating equilibrium that features type-signalling. The appendix contains the complete formal description of the strategies; details of belief updating on and off-the-equilibrium path; and an analysis of the no-deviation conditions for the players for different histories. 
, then the following strategies constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this repeated CR game with social preferences:
If the leader chooses TA in the first period, an S-type B will prefer that the leader continues TA and will not challenge as a beneficiary. When   A and the leader she is an SP-type. The leader will switch to TB in the second period since TA is not profitable due to expected joint resistance. If A is also an SP-type, this initial signal will lead the responders to coordinate on successful joint challenge again in the second period, and the leader will conclude that both A and B are the SP-type. This will induce the leader to play NT thereafter. If the probability that A is an S-type is sufficiently small-in particular, less than the second term in the minimum function in Result 2-the SP-type B will signal her type by challenging as a beneficiary, as the risk that this could result in her becoming a permanent transgression victim is sufficiently low.
In addition, both types of A will challenge as a victim if and only if the probability that B
is an S-type is sufficiently low-in particular, lower than the first term in the minimum function in Result 2. This is why the probability that an agent is an S-type must satisfy the two conditions in the minimum function. For the leader to randomize between TA and TB instead of choosing No Transgression in the first period, it must be the case that the probability that an agent is an SP-type is not too high, which is given by the first inequality regarding p in Result 2.
In the (pooling) trigger strategy equilibrium in Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 , the threat of a permanent switch to playing (TAB, AC, AC) serves to facilitate cooperation between A and B and deter transgression, and transgression never occurs in this equilibrium even when one extends the repeated CR game to allow for social preferences and incomplete information about preferences. In the separating equilibrium described in Result 2, successful coordinated challenge can induce the leader to play NT if both responders have social preferences, and this successful coordination occurs only after the players incur the cost to signal their types through resistance to some initial periods of DAC transgression. This equilibrium also suggests that the experience of meeting successful joint resistance to DAC transgression is important to induce the leader to switch to playing NT, and that a leader will switch to practicing the -alternative DAC‖ if earlier attempts of DAC have been challenged by the beneficiary. Note that in this repeated game equilibrium, as in the one-shot version (Result 1), the victim also challenges with a higher probability than the beneficiary. In equilibrium, in the initial periods, both an S-type victim and an SP-type victim challenge against DAC, but only the SP-type beneficiary challenges, which reflect again the important role of the beneficiary in facilitating coordinated challenges. We report empirical tests of these implications in section 4 below.
Experimental Design
To study the effect of repetition and communication in the CR game, we conduct 36 independent sessions across six different repeated game treatments, as summarized in Table 1, involving 324 human subjects. To compare the effect of communication in one-shot game to the effect of repetition, our data analysis also includes two treatments (144 additional subjects) featuring random matching (with and without communication) previously reported in Cason and Mui (2007) . Subjects were recruited by e-mail and through web page and classroom announcements from the general student population, and all were inexperienced in the sense that they participated in only one session of this study. Sessions lasted for at least 48 decision periods. As noted in the introduction, this is one of the first experimental studies to examine the interaction of type of repeated play and communication using a full factorial design.
The experiment instructions employed neutral terminology. For example, -Person 1‖ chose -earnings square‖ A, B, C or D-which was the transgression decision-and then -Persons 2 and 3‖ simultaneously selected either X or Y-which was the challenge decision.
(Instructions for the Indefinite Repetition/Communication are in Appendix I.) At the end of every period, subjects learned all actions and monetary payoffs for the three persons in their group, and they recorded these choices and their own earnings on a hardcopy record sheet so they always had easy access to their own history. Each session had nine participants, but two sessions were always conducted simultaneously so 18 subjects were present in the lab for each data collection period. Subject roles remained fixed: leaders always remained leaders, and responders always remained responders throughout the session.
The Random Matching treatments were conducted for 50 periods and serve as the baseline that corresponds most closely to the one-shot game. In these treatments the instructions emphasized that subjects were randomly re-grouped each period. Cason and Mui (2007) document that subjects' behavior changed across periods in these treatments, possibly because they were learning about the strategic environment of this CR game. In order to provide similar learning opportunities over the same time period, but with a fixed set of playing partners, subjects in the Long Horizon (hereafter LH) Finite Repetition treatment were randomly grouped to form a three-person group in period 1, and these groupings remained fixed for all 50 periods.
This allows us to assess subjects' behavior in an environment where the No Transgression outcome can be supported as an equilibrium using trigger strategies for nearly all of the session.
The separating equilibrium described above makes specific predictions about how transgression and resistance may vary between the early and later rounds of each supergame, and therefore it is useful to have a larger number of shorter supergames to explore the implications of this equilibrium. The Indefinite Repetition treatment and the Equivalent Horizon Finite
Repetition treatment serve this purpose.
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In the Indefinite Repetition treatment, groupings lasted for a random number of periods.
At the end of each period in this treatment, the experimenter threw an eight-sided die, and for die rolls of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 the groupings remained unchanged for another period. When the die roll was 8 the current grouping was immediately terminated. At that point each participant was randomly re-grouped with two other participants to form a new three-person group. All groupings terminated probabilistically using the die rolls, and no groupings were artificially ended due to time limits. 11 An average of 6 supergames (max=10, min=3) were conducted per session in this treatment.
In the Equivalent Horizon (hereafter EH) Finite Repetition treatment, subjects were randomly regrouped at the end of every 8 th period. The experimenter also made a verbal announcement that regrouping was taking place at these periods. These sessions lasted for 48 total periods (6 supergames). Since supergames end with a probability of 1/8 in each period in the Indefinite Repetition treatment, the repeated game has an expected horizon of 8 periods. Dal Bó (2005) argues that to compare the difference between finite and indefinite repetition of a particular game, one should consider a finitely repeated game where its horizon is the same as the expected horizon of the indefinitely repeated game. Consistent with theoretical prediction, Dal Bó (2005) finds that for the prisoner's dilemma, holding the expected horizon constant, indefinite repetition results in higher levels of cooperation than finite repetition. Unlike the prisoner's dilemma, however, theory predicts that indefinite and finite repetitions with the same expected horizon should not generate significant behavioral differences in the CR game. The Equivalent Horizon Finite Repetition treatment allows us to test this prediction. 11 We avoided hitting the time constraint through a session termination rule that was explained to subjects in the beginning of the session: If the total number of periods conducted in the session at the conclusion of a grouping exceeded 49, or if less than 30 minutes remained in the two and a half hour time period reserved for the session, then a new re-grouping was not initiated and the session was terminated.
Results
Overall Transgression Rate
Figure 2 presents the time series of the rate the leaders transgress, separately for all eight treatments. These transgressions are overwhelmingly the divide-and-conquer type, and transgression against both responders is uncommon. Nearly half of the attempts to transgress against both responders occur in periods 1 through 10, but these transgressions are met with successful coordinated resistance 69 percent of the time. This discourages leaders from pursuing this most aggressive type of transgression, and after these initial 10 periods 95.5 percent of the transgressions are the DAC type.
The figure shows that transgression rates vary between about 50 and 85 percent in the early periods, and the treatments tend to diverge rather than converge over time. Transgression rates exhibit a downward trend in three of the four communication treatments (shown with dashed lines), but several of the no communication treatments have an upward trend. In the baseline treatment with no communication and random matching, the transgression rate rises above 95 percent in the last ten periods. Because our main interest is in stable behavior following the learning phase, in some of the data analysis we will exclude the initial 20 periods and focus on the later periods.
Finding 1: Repeated play reduces the rate that leaders transgress, but no significant differences exist in overall transgression rates between the different repeated game treatments.
Support: 
Resistance in the Divide-and-Conquer Subgames
As noted above, well over 90 percent of the later-period transgressions are the DAC type.
The separating equilibrium in Result 2 suggests that victims resist transgressions more frequently than beneficiaries. Consistent with this prediction, Figure 3 shows that victims start resisting about 50 to 60 percent of the time in early periods, but this rate usually declines over time to less than 40 percent in late periods. By comparison, early average beneficiary resistance rates usually start between 20 and 30 percent, and decline to between 10 and 20 percent in later periods.
In order to determine how effectively the responders coordinate their resistance in the 13 Each grouping of three subjects is statistically independent in the LH Finite Repetition treatment because subjects are never regrouped. This leads to 18 independent observations per treatment for this matching protocol.
25 repeated game, we first evaluate empirically whether overall joint resistance rates differ from the relevant one-shot game baseline when considering all the late session periods pooled. ; n=8, m=6, one-tailed p-value<0.10 ).
The separating equilibrium described in Section 2.3, however, suggests that this simple comparison of the overall resistance rates in later periods of each session fails to account for an endogenous selection bias. In particular, joint resistance should occur more often in early rounds of a given supergame since responders have the incentive to signal their types to try to achieve coordination. In later rounds of a supergame, responders have either succeeded and the leader will no longer be practicing DAC transgression, or they have failed, in which case the leader will 14 We also estimated random effects probit regressions that are more powerful because they include all observations of DAC transgression, and not just the session averages, but they provide identical conclusions.
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be successfully transgressing and the responders will have given up resisting. The equilibrium thus identifies a selection bias, in that DAC transgressions that are observed in the later rounds of a supergame should be significantly less likely to be successfully resisted. This pattern is clearly evident in the data. Both of these are significantly higher than the joint resistance rate of 12.6 percent for the Random Matching/Communication baseline (U=6.5 and U=11; n=8, m=6, one-tailed pvalue<0.05 for both). The joint resistance rate during the later supergame rounds is 16.3 percent in Indefinite Repetition and 11.3 percent in EH Finite Repetition. Neither of these are different from the 12.6 percent rate in the Random Matching baseline (U=18 and U=21; n=8, m=6, onetailed p-value<0.05 for both).
Result 2 highlights that it is risky for an SP-type beneficiary to signal her type by challenging DAC transgression in the repeated CR game. Communication is not observed by the leader, so it provides a less risky coordinating device for an SP-type beneficiary to signal her type to the victim before undertaking the risky action of challenging the leader. Comparing the two columns of Table 3 indicates that communication improves coordination in the repeated game, and these differences are highly significant in the EH Finite and Indefinite Repetition treatments (Mann-Whitney p-values<0.05). Furthermore, if the communication is responsible for signaling preference types and this resulting increase in coordination, it should be possible to identify a relationship between resistance in the repeated game and the messages exchanged in the communication. We therefore investigate the content of responders' communication and the patterns of resistance over time in the repeated game to understand better how they coordinate. Table 4 indicates that communication helps coordinate successful resistance. Rows 1 and 2 show that successful joint resistance never occurs more than 4 percent of the time when the beneficiary does not signal intended resistance. By contrast, row 4 shows that successful joint resistance occurs 48 to 70 percent of the time when both responders indicate intended resistance. Even when only the beneficiary indicates an intention to resist, the successful joint resistance rate reaches about 30 percent in the finite horizon treatments. Table 5 presents statistical support for the conclusion that both victims and beneficiaries choose to resist a DAC transgression when the beneficiary or (especially) when both responders indicate that they intend to resist. These fixed effects logit models indicate that the likelihood of actual resistance for both victims and beneficiaries is always significantly higher when only the beneficiary or when both responders indicate an intention to resist, compared to the omitted case of no intended resistance. The beneficiary's intention apparently plays a more important role to facilitate coordinated resistance, since the impact of the victims' intention is always smaller and sometimes insignificant. Note that a dummy variable for the first three rounds of the supergame is positive and significant for the Indefinite Repetition treatment, providing additional support for Finding 5, that resistance is greater early in the supergames.
The equilibrium described in Result 2 shows how type signaling can occur through repeated play even without communication, but this may require several periods of interaction.
Earlier periods of the supergame provide an opportunity for the responders to send signals to each other that they have social preferences and will resist transgression in later periods.
Finding 7: In the repeated games, earlier period resistance to DAC transgression significantly increases resistance to later DAC transgression; however, adding communication increases
responders' resistance more substantially.
Support: Table 6 presents fixed effects logit models of DAC resistance for the three repeated game treatments without communication. These models are similar to those in Table 5 , except that the intended resistance communications are replaced by actual previous resistance to DAC transgression in the previous period of that same supergame. Only DAC transgressions that are immediately preceded by a DAC transgression are included for these model estimates. The table shows that previous DAC resistance strongly influences later resistance. Similar to the pattern shown for intentions in Table 5 , in several columns of Table 6 the victim-only resistance indicators often appear weaker than the other types of previous resistance.
The top three rows of Table 7 report that previous period resistance has a weaker influence on current resistance in the Communication treatments. The logit models in this table include both the previous resistance as well as the current period communications, essentially combining the explanatory variables used in Tables 5 and 6 . Current period resistance is systematically more likely only when both responders resisted in the previous period. By contrast, the variables representing different intention messages shown in the middle of the table indicate that both responders always strongly increase actual resistance when the beneficiary alone, or both responders, indicate an intention to resist. Likelihood ratio tests shown toward the bottom of this table indicate that the communications are always jointly highly significant determinants of both victim and beneficiary resistance, but previous period resistance sometimes has an insignificant influence on current resistance. Apparently communication is more effective than the history of past resistance to coordinate responders' current resistance. In the presence of multiple equilibria, communicated intentions about future actions may provide less noisy 30 information than actual past actions, and hence may be more useful in facilitating coordination.
Leader Responses to Histories in the Repeated Games
The equilibrium in Result 2 suggests that the experience of successful joint resistance can be important in inducing the leader to switch to choosing No Transgression, and that the leaders will target beneficiaries who challenge DAC transgressions. As discussed earlier, resistance by a beneficiary is risky because it can cause the leader to switch to transgress repeatedly against her if the other responder is an S-type. Consistent with this implication of the separating equilibrium, the evidence clearly indicates that leaders target beneficiaries who resist DAC transgression. Define a supergame that converges to transgression in the EH Finite Repetition as one with leader transgression in 6 or more out of the 8 periods. In 9 of these supergames the leader chose DAC transgression in the first period and experienced resistance by only the beneficiary, and he switched to target that beneficiary with the alternative DAC transgression in 8 of these 9 cases (89 percent). Similarly, in 13 of these supergames the leader chose DAC transgression in the first period and experienced joint resistance by the beneficiary and victim, and he switched to target the beneficiary with the alternative DAC transgression in 10 of these 13 cases (77 percent). The leader responses in the other repeated game treatments are similar, since the likelihood of switching to the alternative DAC transgression rather than remain with the same DAC transgression is always significantly higher following beneficiary resistance in a series of (unreported) logit regressions.
This finding suggests that the risk associated with type signaling through resistance by a beneficiary can limit the effectiveness of repetition in facilitating cooperation in the CR game.
However, while a leader can target a challenging beneficiary in subsequent rounds in a supergame, he cannot employ such a strategy in the absence of repeated interaction in the Random Matching environment. Furthermore, because communication is not observed by the leader, it provides a less risky device for an SP-type beneficiary to signal her type to the other responder than the act of challenging in a supergame. These observations may partially explain Finding 2, which reports that communication alone in the Random Matching treatment is at least as effective as repetition in reducing transgression.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the pervasiveness of divide-and-conquer strategy in leader transgressions, only recently have scholars begun to study systematically its implications (Weingast, 1995 (Weingast, , 1997 (Weingast, , 32 2005 Acemoglu et al., 2004) . This paper reports the first experimental study to evaluate how repeated interactions with and without communication between -responders‖ can coordinate their resistance towards such transgressions. It also presents theoretical and empirical findings to address how social preferences can affect the effectiveness of repetition in facilitating coordination and deterring transgression.
The three-person Coordinated Resistance game studied in this paper allows for interesting endogenous role asymmetries among the players, a feature that is not present in widely studied games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. In the CR game, when the leader engages in divide-and-conquer transgression, he is proposing a collusive agreement with one responder to extract surplus from the other. This endogenously leads to asymmetric beneficiary and victim roles for the responders. Sustaining the efficient outcome of
No Transgression that maximizes total surplus is difficult, because this requires deterring the leader from practicing divide-and-conquer transgression. Deterring the leader requires the beneficiary to act against her material interest, and also to successfully coordinate with the victim to challenge the transgression. Nevertheless, we find that both finite and indefinite repetition reduce transgression. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that multiple equilibria in the stage game implies a lack of sharp difference between finite and indefinite repetition in the CR game, there is no significant difference in the transgression rate in the Finite and the Indefinite Horizon treatments.
We also find support for the hypothesis that type signaling through a separating equilibrium is important in affecting behavior in the presence of private information about social preferences. Successful resistance to DAC transgression occurs more frequently in the early rounds of the supergames than the later rounds; the -intended choice‖ communicated by the 33 beneficiary is critical to increase resistance to DAC transgression; and leaders target beneficiaries who resist DAC transgression. We also find that communication increases joint resistance in the repeated game, indicating that it facilitates coordination in the presence of multiple equilibria,
The separating equilibrium we highlight shows that even a beneficiary who has social preferences and would prefer to punish transgressing leaders may not resist in a repeated CR game. This is because she risks revealing her type to the leader and could become a perpetual victim in future DAC transgressions. Although repetition can facilitate cooperation, the risk faced by the responders in the presence of the endogenous role asymmetries in this three-person game imposes a limit on their ability to take advantage of the benefits offered by repetition. To our knowledge, this paper is the first one that provides theoretical articulation and empirical support for the insight that the risk associated with cooperation due to endogenous role asymmetry can limit the effectiveness of repeated interaction in facilitating cooperation.
Our findings also provide insight regarding how repeated interactions and even simple and nonbinding communication can help reveal information about social preference types and coordinate resistance to divide-and-conquer transgression. This suggests the natural conjecture that societies and organizations that have invested resources in fostering social interactions to facilitate type identification among different groups of individuals-even interactions that are not political in nature per se-may be less likely to suffer from divide-and conquer transgression by their leaders. Furthermore, studies that take into account the absence or presence of institutions that facilitate type identification may better predict the incidence of transgression.
Future theoretical, field and laboratory studies that investigate these conjectures may provide a more complete understanding of the role of coordinated resistance in deterring transgression. All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent level;
† denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests). Notes: All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent level; † denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests). All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent level;
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† denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests). The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics are distributed  2 (3 d.f.). 
